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organizations. Nevetheless, they contributed to a more effective border control 
and a major drop in the number of arriving immigrants. As those measures also 
enjoy broad public support in Hungary, they helped the governing Fidesz par-
ty increase its popularity. The leftist parties tended to stuck into the conventio-
nal humanist position and proved to be unable to change their platform and 
rhetoric after the terrorist attacks in Western Europe. The strongest challen-
ge could have been presented by Jobbik, the party of extreme right. However,
benefitting from both the governmental position and the wider media reach 
out, Fidesz could keep the agenda under control, absorbed some of the policy 
ideas of Jobbik and presented them as own proposals fitting well into its consi-
stently rigid anti-immigration and pro-soveregnity policy line.
In addition, the migration crisis brought the Visegrad countries closer to 
each other and made them capable to formulate joint platforms and re-easta-
blish a closer cooperation than in the previous years. Nevertheless, the govern-
ment will continue to face legal and political disputes both at international and 
EU level, but it is important to stress that those conflicts seem to make Fidesz 
supporters more committed and determined, which can serve the party as a va-
luable political asset ahead of next year’s elections.
Compared to the other Visegrad countries, Hungary was definitely the most 
affected by mass migration, which resulted in a relatively significant proportion 
of people gaining personal experience of immigrants. As opposed to general 
expectations, this did no translate into higher support for immigrants and refu-
gees; on the contrary, the overwhelming majority of those with personal expe-
rience had rather negative views on the migrants. Therefore, the government-
driven anti-migration campaigns only reinforced already existing reservations 
and hostility towards immigrants of markedly distinct cultural background. 
While both the government and the general public assess EU responses to the 
migration crisis rather negatively, they would like to see a more active role of 
the EU in finding an effective solution to the crisis. The majority view of Hun-
garians is in line with the policies of the government: they would prefer to take 
actions outside the terrtitory of the European Union and invest heavily into 
international cooperation and aid targeting the crisis zones in hope of giving 
them peace and stability.
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3.1. Introduction
There was hardly any migration policy in Poland at the time of its political 
transition. The EU accession process seemed to be a natural incentive to deve-
lop a legal and institutional framework which, in the case of Poland, was more 
inspired by the public administration than it was a grass-roots process deri-
ving from actual needs connected with intensive migration patterns. In 1991 
Poland began to sign and respect most significant instruments of international 
law dedicated to the protection of refugees. In 1991, Poland became a member 
of the Council of Europe, in 1992 joined the International Organization for 
Migration and in 1993 ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.1 Poland is generally perceived as an emi-
gration country, which is a result of the increasing number of Polish emigrants 
since the country joined the EU.2 Until the recent migration crisis, immigra-
tion to Poland constituted only an insignificant percentage, while emigration 
after 2004 intensified even further.3 However, for the past couple of years, it has 
been taking increasing numbers of foreigners, especially from Eastern Europe. 
Poland, in spite of the migration crisis, still has a homogenous popula-
tion with only 1.6% of the population being foreign-born in 2015.4 What is 
more, the current migration crisis is not affecting Poland to the same extent, as 
the most numerous migrant nationalities are culturally similar to Poles. The-
se nationalities are Russians (4,000 in 2014), Ukrainians (2,275 in 2014) and 
Georgians (720 in 2014).5 What is more, the number of asylum applications 
in 2014 decreased compared to 2013 from 13,758 to 6,810.6 The percentage 
1 Dz.U. z 1993 r., Nr 61, poz. 284. 
2 I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Okólski, Emigracja ostatnia?, Warszawa 2009. 
3 Społeczne skutki poakcesyjnych migracji ludności Polski, Warszawa, Komitet Badań nad Migracjami PAN, 
czerwiec, 2014, pp. 56–59. 
4 “Foreign-born Population by Country of Birth”, 1 January 2015, Eurostat, http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Foreign-born_population_by_country_of_birth_1_
January_2015_(¹)_YB16.png [accessed: 14.02.2017].
5 “Asylum in the EU, 53/2015”, 20 March 2015, Eurostat, p. 4. 
6 “International Migration Database”, OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG 
[accessed: 14.02.2017].
151
of positive first instance asylum decisions is also lower in Poland than the EU 
average. Of the 2,700 applications in 2014, only 720 (or 26%) were agreed 
(in comparison to the EU average of 45%).7 Generally speaking, Polish migra-
tion policy and especially admission law, in spite of the fact that adjustments 
have already been made to meet European standards, is less favourable to mi-
grants. However, Ukrainians, who now constitute one of the most numerous 
groups migrating to Poland, admit that legal barriers do not restrain the influx 
of migrants, but rather differentiate strategies of entering Poland.8 This seems 
proof of aninsufficient and ineffective migration policy so far, and of the need 
to implement it further.
Table 3.1
Number of Asylum Seekers in Poland 2008–2014








Source: “International Migration Database”, OECD, https://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx? DataSetCode=MIG [accessed: 14.02.2017]. 
The inadequacies of Polish migration policy must lead to a variety of actions 
and force further adjustments to be made in this area.9 Due to its location, 
economic condition and internal policies, Poland should actually be regarded 
as a transit rather than an immigration country. The reasons for such a situation 
derive from Polish economic conditions as well as the general attitude of Poles 
toward foreigners. At the same time, the Polish government has already ack-
nowledged foreigners as human resources necessary for economic development 
in a medium- and long-term perspective. The age structure of the Polish po-
pulation is drastically changing, as is the proportion of active and passive citi-
zens in the labour market. During the Economic Forum in Krynica in Septem-
ber 2016, the Minister of Development, Mateusz Morawiecki, announced the 
need to supplement the deficiencies of the Polish labour market with workers 
from Ukraine. This strategy was already voiced in 2015, when the government 
7 “Asylum in the EU, 53/2015”..., p. 6.
8 “Poland: Becoming a Country of Sustained Immigration”, [in:] Idea Working Papers, eds A. Górny, 
I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Lesińska, M. Okólski, May 2009, p. 99.
9 Kancelaria Prezydenta RP, 2015, p. 50.
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highlighted the need to use an external labour force within the Polish mar-
ket.10 This attitude demonstrates Poland’s focus on the popular assumption that 
migration and integration policy should serve socio-economic development. 
A balance is required here between the implementation of labour market rules 
and respect for citizens’ rights to mobility and free choice of employment and 
residence. Another challenge is to ensure that the rights of foreign-born wor-
kers are equal to the standards enjoyed by Polish citizens.11
Many plans and recommendations have been prepared by the PO-PSL co-
alition government, which were treated as a first step in the preparation for and 
response to the migration crisis. Thanks to consultations with the Chancellery 
of the President Bronisław Komorowski, the main pillars of Polish migration 
policy have been outlined. The first pillar comprises strategies oriented around 
Polish citizens and aspects of repatriation. The second pillar is based on actions 
directed at foreigners already on Polish territory. These actions are focused both 
on labour migrants and those in need of protection. However, the current mi-
gration crisis means that once again new circumstances have arisen creating the 
necessity of reshaping and further adjusting migration and integration policy.
3.2. Migration Policy in Poland 
(Anna Kobierecka, Michał Rulski)
The main goal of this part of the chapter is to comprehensively describe 
the shape of the legal and institutional framework of Polish migration and in-
tegration policy, as well as to identify at least its basic needs and directions. 
The Polish case is a specific one, as the country has the EU’s largest overland 
external border. In the face of both the European migration crisis and increased 
migration flows caused by the Ukrainian crisis, it is necessary to carry out an 
in-depth analysis of the Polish migration policy system.
3.2.1. Legal Framework
The history of Polish migration policy has been comparatively short, as it 
was created in response to the political transition of 1989 and remains an on-
going process. The first stage was completed in 1997 with the enactment of the 
Aliens Act. This new dimension of Polish migration policy with in a democratic 
system was based on both human rights and the respect of freedom of move-
10 Ibidem, pp. 52–53.
11 Ibidem, p. 51.
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ment, with special regard to the repatriation of Polish citizens (especially from 
the former USSR).12 Regulations concerning migrants were included in the 
new Constitution, adopted in 1997. According to art. 56, migrants are permit-
ted to exercise their right to asylum in Poland on the legal basis of an adequ-
ate act. Additionally, any migrant seeking protection in Poland can be granted 
refugee status according to international regulations.13 The next stage encom-
passed the necessary adjustments required by accession to the European Union 
and the first attempts to create a common visa and asylum system. During that 
period, and for the first time in Poland, those legal aspects pertaining to gene-
ral provisions concerning migrants and those relating to the provision of pro-
tection to migrants were separated. 
Important changes to the Polish legal and institutional framework have been 
ongoing since Poland’s accession to the EU. The first breakthrough for Poland 
took place in 2007, when Poland joined the Schengen Area, which entailed the 
abolition of border controls within the EU, combined with increased security 
regulations at the EU’s external borders. A new Aliens Act was also introduced 
in 2012. The main aim of the proposed adjustments was the harmonization 
of the Polish legal system with two new European directives on returns proce-
dures for illegal migrants and conditions for receiving migrants from third co-
untries willing to work in highly qualified professions. The next amendment 
to the Act entered into force in 2014,14 simplifying procedures for obtaining 
a residence permit and introducing benefits for migrants working and study-
ing in Poland. This amendment served to limit illegal migration – in the period 
2014–2015, there was a 76% increase in the number of applications legalizing 
residence, when compared with the 2013–2014 period.15 In 2015, another 
amendment to the Act was made concerning the provision of protection to fo-
reigners as a result of the migration crisis. The adjustment aimed to enable the 
relocation of foreigners granted refugee status in another European country.16 
New challenges deriving from intensified migration from Syria and other Mid-
dle Eastern countries resulted in the necessity of making further improvements 
to Polish migration policy and its legal framework.
In 2003, an Act on granting protection was introduced. In this Act, a defini-
tion of mandatory refugees was proposed. The Act states that a refugee in Poland 
12 S. Łodziński, M. Szonert, “Niepolityczna polityka? Kształtowanie się polityki migracyjnej w Polsce 
w latach 1989–2016”, CMR Working Papers, 90/148, Warszawa, Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami, 2016, p. 18.
13 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., Art. 56, p. 11.
14 Ustawa z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 r. o cudzoziemcach (Dz.U. z 2013 r., poz. 1650). 
15 Podsumowanie roku obowiązywania ustawy o cudzoziemcach, Urząd ds. Cudzoziemców, Warszawa, 
czerwiec 2015. 
16 Dz.U. z 2015 r., poz. 1607. 
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is a foreign-born person acknowledged as a refugee by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. It also provides migrants with the following forms 
of protection:
granting of refugee status•	
provision of additional protection•	
permission for a tolerated stay•	
provision of temporary protection.•	 17
Both the Aliens Act and the Act on granting protection are the two most si-
gnificant legal documents concerning aspects related to the acceptance of mi-
grants and refugees in Poland. They are additionally supplemented by other 
legal acts concerning, among other factors, social care provision for migrants 
in Poland, the conditions of providing citizenship, etc. 
One of the most significant aspects of constantly adjusting and developing 
Polish migration policy is providing for stable economic development and pro-
moting employment among Poles and migrants. Poland has become one of the 
few European countries to provide an open market for temporary and seaso-
nal workers from Eastern European countries, such as Armenia, Belarus, Geo-
rgia, Moldavia, Russia and Ukraine.18 In recent years, Ukrainians have been one 
of the most numerous national groups coming to Poland for economic reasons.
Currently, one of the most significant documents on migration policy in 
Poland is a document entitled “Polish migration policy – current state of play 
and further actions”, developed by a special Working Group on Migration, 
which has been working since 2007 and was accepted by the government 
in 2012. The document appears to tackle the basic areas of migration policy: 
legal and illegal migration, the protection, integration, naturalization and re-
patriation of migrants, labour migration as well as legal, institutional and in-
ternational determinants. The document assumes that Poland will not become 
an immigration country in the near future; nevertheless, it outlines the need to 
focus predominantly on aspects deriving from labour market needs and labour 
migration.19 It is also worth noting that the implementation plan was adopted 
by the Polish government on 2 December 2014. According to internal docu-
ments, Poland has been progressively improving in such areas as responding 
to international conditions, emigration and return from emigration and adju-
17 Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczy- 
pospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. z 2003 r., poz. 680, p. 5.
18 Rozporządzenie Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej z dnia 1 kwietnia 2015 r. w sprawie wydawania 
zezwolenia na pracę cudzoziemca, Dz.U. z 2015 r., poz., p. 543. 
19 Rada Ministrów, Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania, Warszawa 2013, 
pp. 3–4, 11.
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sting the institutional and legal systems. Unfortunately, the guidelines created 
by national institutions show that Poland has had significant difficulties with 
monitoring migration processes, as well as with the integration of migrants. 
This aspect was underlined a report prepared by the Ministry of the Interior 
in the third quarter of 2015.20
Also in 2013, the President’s Administrative Office developed a working pa-
per concerning the shaping of migration policy doctrine, its terms and its most 
significant elements. It focuses on a wide variety aspects relating to labour mi-
gration.21 It is worth mentioning the fact that decisions made by the Polish au-
thorities go much further than the law introduced by Directive 2014/36/EU 
of The European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of em-
ployment as seasonal workers, as multi-seasonal permits were introduced.22 
This legal solution preserved the legal opportunity for migrant workers to work 
for six months of the year without having a work permit. In practice, this pro-
cedure is used especially in the agricultural sector.23 Controlling the legality 
of migrant employment should be the joint responsibility of the National 
Labour Inspectorate and the border guards. The current cooperation of both 
entities primarily concerns the exchange of experience and a common interpre-
tation of obligatory law.24
When analysing the legal framework of Polish migration policy, it must be 
noted that basic migration laws have been gradually developing since 1989. 
The first stage encompassed the creation of at least basic provisions on migra-
tion, mostly regarding the repatriation of former Polish citizens. Since Polish 
society was ethnically homogenous, and owing to its noticeably worse econo-
mic situation in comparison with Western European countries, it did not at-
tract many migrants, Poland hardly had any provisions concerning migration 
policy. The next stage was outlined by the EU accession process. This resulted 
in the need to adjust Polish laws on migration, asylum seeking and the provi-
sion of protection for migrants to EU standards, at least to some extent. The 
construction of Polish migration policy is an ongoing process, influenced by 
many determinants; among others, it is influenced by changing EU law and 
other external determinants such as the current migration crisis.
20 Sprawozdanie, 2015, p. 1.
21 Polityka migracyjna Polski. Zasady i rekomendacje, Biuletyn Forum Debaty Publicznej nr 36, lipiec, 
Warszawa: Kancelaria Prezydenta Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, 2015. 
22 Sprawozdanie, p. 6.
23 Uzasadnienie, 2016.
24 Sprawozdanie, 2016, p. 6.
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many determinants; among others, it is influenced by changing EU law and 
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20 Sprawozdanie, 2015, p. 1.
21 Polityka migracyjna Polski. Zasady i rekomendacje, Biuletyn Forum Debaty Publicznej nr 36, lipiec, 
Warszawa: Kancelaria Prezydenta Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, 2015. 
22 Sprawozdanie, p. 6.
23 Uzasadnienie, 2016.
24 Sprawozdanie, 2016, p. 6.
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3.2.2. Institutional Framework
Similar to the gradual construction of a legal framework for migration po-
licy, an institutional framework has been evolving. In 1989, responsibility for 
migration and integration policy was taken over by already existing administra-
tive institutions; however, the range of their responsibilities changed.25 At the 
same time, new structures were also created. In 1990, the Border Guard was es-
tablished. In 1993, the Migration Office was created and then transformed into 
the Migration and Refugee Department within the Ministry of the Interior, 
which was the most significant administrative nexus responsible for migration 
policy. Later on, in 2007, the Migration Policy Department was created wi-
thin the Ministry.26 Additionally, in 2001, the Office for Repatriation and Fo-
reigners was introduced, the main aim of which was to elaborate the main aims 
of Polish migration policy.27 The role of the Office is now providing migrants 
– both labour migrants and refugees – with complex and professional assistance 
to help legalize their stay and granting them protection.28
Together with administrative institutions such as ministries and depart-
ments, other state agencies are also involved in migration policy, albeit indi-
rectly. For example, the larger contribution that could be made by the Internal 
Security Agency by being able to properly access data from the Wiza-Con-
sul system, should be taken into consideration. If it had access to the system, 
the Agency would be more effective in facing the challenges of the globalized 
world. Nonetheless, such a transfer of competences could mean a feud between 
the Foreign Office and the Agency.29 Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
partially responsible for migration policy in terms of security. According to the 
new Act of 12 December 2013 on foreigners, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
is responsible for the creation a central visa system,30 which consists of data on 
people allowed to enter Poland, as well as on individuals who have been inter-
cepted at the borders.31
3.2.2.1. The Ministry of the Interior and Administration
The Ministry of the Interior and Administration is responsible for all aspects 
connected with Polish citizenship, the legal aspects of obtaining citizenship 
for migrants and repatriation procedures. Currently, the legal basis for gran-
25 S. Łodziński, M. Szonert, op. cit., p. 13.
26 Zarządzenie nr 26 Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dnia 14 marca 2007 r. w sprawie nadania statutu 
Ministerstwu Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji, M. P. Nr 18, poz. 216.
27 S. Łodziński, M. Szonert, op. cit., p. 21.  
28 Urząd do spraw Cudzoziemców, https://udsc.gov.pl/urzad/misja-urzedu/ [accessed: 14.02.2017].
29 Sprawozdanie, p. 1, 3.
30 Art. 449 Ustawy z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 r. o cudzoziemcach.
31 Art. 428, ust 1 Ustawy z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 r. o cudzoziemcach.
157
ting Polish citizenship to migrants is the Act of 2 April 2009 on Polish Citi-
zenship.32 According to the Act, a migrant can obtain citizenship after submit-
ting his/her respective application, and only in the case of meeting a number 
of conditions. The Ministry is also responsible, among other things, for natio-
nal and ethnic minorities. Within the Ministry, the Department of National 
and Ethnic Minorities has been working since 2000. Its main focus is the ma-
nagement of state policy on national and ethnic minorities, as well as counte-
racting discrimination. 
3.2.2.2. The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy
The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy has been responsible 
for implementing and managing integration policy and regulating migrants’ 
access to the Polish labour market since 2004. Integration policy, which has been 
developed and subsequently implemented by the Ministry, is based on four main 
pillars: political, legal, institutional and meritocratic.33 The Ministry carries out 
its integration policy on the basis of the Social Assistance Act, signed in March 
2004. Chapter 5 of the Act is completely dedicated to the social integration 
of migrants.34 Additional information concerning conditions for granting 
support to migrants are included in the ordinance by the Ministry of Family, 
Labour and Social Policy of 2015.35
3.2.3. Other Polish Policies Addressing Migration
The migration crisis that has struck Europe in recent years is causing signi-
ficant confusion for migration policy, both in the EU as a whole and in certain 
European states. Current legal and institutional solutions to the migration crisis 
have proved inefficient. Therefore, a wide and far-reaching debate on necessary 
adjustments has become a significant part of political discussions in Europe. 
Assessing Poland’s attitude towards migration crisis management has been 
difficult due to the change of government in October 2016. In spite of a dec-
laration by the new government formulated by Beata Szydło that it would 
sustain the commitments made by the previous coalition, its formal standpoint 
changed in the first half of 2016 after further unrest caused by the migration 
crisis. Konrad Szymański, Minister for European Affairs within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that: “In view of the tragic events in Paris, 
32 Dz.U. z 2012 r., poz. 161.
33 These aspects are analysed in the latter part of the chapter, as they are dedicated to the social 
integration of migrants in Poland.
34 Ustawa z dnia 12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy społecznej, Dz.U. z 2015 r., poz. 163.
35 Rozporządzenie Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej z dnia 7 kwietnia 2015 r., Dz.U. z 2015 r., poz. 515.
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Poland is left with no other political option but to withhold its approval for the 
relocation of refugees”.36
Polish activity in the migration crisis and its potential solutions has underta-
ken mostly in the arena of the Visegrad Group. All four member states present 
a rather sceptic view of receiving migrants from the Middle East and the intro-
duction of an EU obligatory refugee quota. For example, in November 2016, 
the V4 states announced their plans to introduce a migration crisis manage-
ment centre to coordinate aid for refugees outside of the EU. The main propo-
sals suggested by the V4 mostly focused on providing help for refugees outside 
of the EU while simultaneously tightening the EU’s external borders.37
3.2.4. Social Integration
Poland, according to MIPEX 2015 research, ranked 32 out of 38 examined 
states across the world for its migrant integration policies which seems proof 
of its ineffective integration mechanisms. The areas in which Poland was evalu-
ated least favourably were political participation and education38 – both spheres 
that can provide effective tools for integrating migrants and instilling a feeling 
of belonging. However, some progress can be observed in the development 
of new integration policy solutions. Since 2010, Poland has gained an addi-
tional five points in the ranking and no longer falls into the category of sligh-
tly unfavourable for integration. This improvement has been possible owing to 
several legal adjustments made in Poland in recent years, the inter alia passing 
of the 2010 Equal Treatment Act, the implementation of the 2012 Polish 
Citizenship Act and the 2013 introduction of amendments to the Aliens Act.39 
In spite of these improvements, Poland still lacks a comprehensive integration 
policy, especially when compared to other Western countries. All the shortco-
mings of its integration policy are becoming more visible at a time of migration 
crisis when European states, including Poland, are facing new threats to their 
security and internal stabilization. Without effective mechanisms for the inte-
gration of migrants, these threats can become even graver. 
36 “Kukiz: Nieprzyjmowanie uchodźców leży w interesie Polski”, 18 November 2015, Wprost, http://
www.wprost.pl/ar/525455 [accessed: 18.02.2017].
37 “Visegrad Group announces migration crisis management centre”, 21 November 2016, thenews.pl,  http://
www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/280982,Visegrad-Group-announces-migration-crisis-management-
centre [accessed: 20.02.2017]. 
38 “Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015”, CIDOB and Migration Policy Group (MIPEX).
39 Ibidem. 
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3.2.4.1. The Legal Framework of the Polish Integration System
The protection of migrants in Poland is based primarily on the grounds 
of international commitments: the Geneva Convention and the New York Pro-
tocol, as well as EU guidelines. The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Po-
licy (MPiPS) is currently responsible for formulating and conducting integra-
tion policy in Poland. According to MPiPS guidelines from 2013, the main 
aims of Polish integration policy were already developed in a 2005 document 
entitled “Propozycje działań w kierunku stworzenia kompleksowej polityki in-
tegracji cudzoziemców w Polsce [Proposals of actions aimed at establishing 
a comprehensive immigrant integration policy in Poland]”, which was associa-
ted with Poland’s accession to the EU and the need to meet European integra-
tion standards. The document detailed four main levels of integration policy 
development, which were:
1) Political – creating an integration policy compatible with other poli-
tical areas, e.g., migration, asylum, antidiscrimination, social welfare, 
labour, education policies, etc.;
2) Legal – developing legal solutions and regulations entitling migrants 
to the same civic rights and obligations as Polish citizens;
3) Institutional – choosing institutions responsible for facilitating the in-
tegration of migrants as well as establishing cooperation with NGOs 
engaged in assisting migrants;
4) Meritocratic – spreading knowledge of the integration process and all 
spheres related to integration.40
One of the basic documents on the integration of migrations is the Act 
on Social Assistance from 2004. Part II of Chapter 5 is strictly devoted to integra-
tion issues. The Act establishes the rules and mechanisms of integration provided 
by the Polish government. The district head is responsible for providing support 
for migrants legally residing in Poland. According to the law, financial aid can 
only be provided for 12 months in amounts ranging from 446 to 1,175 PLN 
per person per month, which is intended to cover living costs and language 
lessons.41 In 2015, the Act was amended and the terms of financial aid were 
changed. Currently, the peak of the allowance is 1,260 PLN per month during 
the first six months and 90% of that amount for the following six months.42 
40 Propozycje działań w celu stworzenia kompleksowej polityki integracji cudzoziemców w Polsce, Ministry 
of Social Policy, Warszawa 2005, pp. 5–6.
41 Dz.U. z 2004 r. Nr 64, poz. 593, Ustawa z dn. 12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy społecznej, p. 64.
42 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Rozporządzenie Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej 
z dn. 7 kwietnia 2015 r., Warszawa dnia 13 kwietnia 2015 r., p. 1.
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Additionally, the support provided also encompasses health insurance, social 
work, professional counselling and the provision of contacts with labour market 
institutions, local institutions and NGOs. The Act established the mechanism 
of Individual Integration Programme43 – an integration tool that is still in use, 
albeit undergoing some adjustments (discussed below).
Taking into consideration new demographic trends and showing a willin-
gness to provide social cohesion, another document was prepared by MPiPS 
in 2013. It analyses Polish integration policy and indicates the form it should 
take. The main areas of integration policy examined are pre-integration, Indi-
vidual Integration Programmes, access to accommodation, access to the labo-
ur market and access to the education system. Pre-integration is already be-
ing conducted in refugee centres is perceived as transitional phase preparing 
migrants for further integration in the receiving country. Its aim is to inform 
them about the reality of daily life, the labour market situation, social services 
and accommodation possibilities. As a result, migrants have broader knowledge 
of their rights and responsibilities, while the negative effects of waiting for asy-
lum decisions are minimized. Such goals are achieved by:
1) Providing migrant children with access to education (outside of refu-
gee centres);
2) Providing language courses while procedures are conducted;
3) Preparing migrants to enter the labour market by offering vocational 
training and examining professional competences;
4) Providing access to the labour market no later than six months after 
the initiation of the asylum procedure;
5) Providing sporting, cultural and other extra-curricular activities;
6) Providing the assistance of mentors, social workers and legal aid in re-
fugee centres.44
Currently in Poland, there are two reception centres, in which the refugee 
procedure starts, and eight residential centres. 
The already mentioned Individual Integration Programmes [Indywidualne 
Programy Integracji – IPI] play an important role in the integration system 
and are locally managed. The district head is responsible for signing indivi-
dual agreements with migrants, encompassing the conditions of the support 
provided by the district authorities. Their role is to enable more effective inte-
gration into Poland by providing assistance with language education and fin-
ding accommodation and employment. The general idea is to provide migrants 
43 Ustawa z dn. 12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy społecznej, p. 18.
44 MPiPS, Polska polityka integracji cudzoziemców – założenia i wytyczne, Warszawa 2013, p. 5–7.
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with social security and financial support. The IPI are important because they 
are tailor-made and adjusted to each family receiving this assistance. Impro-
vements are planned for the future, including ensuring a wider range of sup-
port and simultaneously guaranteeing more incentives for the migrant to enga-
ge.45 The agreements signed between migrants and local authorities anticipate 
the engagement of both sides and impose certain responsibilities upon them. 
The district centres that help families as representatives of the local authorities 
are obliged to provide migrants with all the necessary information on the IPI, 
assisting with accommodation arrangements, conducting social work with the 
migrant and appointing an employee responsible for arranging the specific form 
of the IPI (programme supervisor) with the migrant. Migrants who are willing 
to benefit from the IPI are obliged to register themselves in their respective di-
strict or province, register with their local employment agency and actively se-
arch for employment, attend language courses, make regular contact with the-
ir programme supervisor and follow all instructions deriving from individual 
arrangements (Ustawa z dn. 12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy społecznej).46
Figure 3.1
Refugee Centres in Poland
Source: http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1633687,1,osrodki-dla-cudzozie 
mcow-w-polsce.read [accessed: 22.01.2017]. 
45 Ibidem, pp. 9–11.
46 Ustawa z dn. 12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy społecznej, p. 66.
Red color: reception centres where the asylum procedure begins, 
Blue color: residential centres
* for persons using benefits outside the centres
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In 2015, 247 individual programmes were provided for refugees, some 
of which had already started in 2014. The appointment of IPIs (considering the 
number of families) was as follows:
Table 3.2
Number of Families (with Refugee Status) Receiving Support  
through IPIs in 2015 



























Source: Own research based on MPiPS, Świadczenia z pomocy 
społecznej udzielane cudzoziemcom w 2015 r. na wsparcie indy-





These programmes were being carried out in almost in all of Poland’s provinces:
Table 3.3
Number of IPIs for Refugees Carried Out  
in Each Province in 2015















Source: Own research based on MPiPS, ibidem.
Taking into consideration that in 2015 in Poland, 695 asylum applica-
tions were positively granted, the number of IPIs carried out in that year seems 
rather low.47
Currently, a new integration programme is being implemented called “opro-
wadzanie po domu [Showing around the house]”. It is a specific course of 30–40 
hours’ duration aimed at reducing tensions between migrants and the society rece-
iving them, as well as improving the accommodation process. They are organized 
locally by local authorities or NGOs. After completing the course, the attendees 
receive a certificate, which should then entitle them to certain benefits. During 
the course, migrants become acquainted with the following information:
1) Information on the Polish legal system;
2) Information on Polish culture and customs;
3) Information on local institutions, local authorities, NGOs and what 
they offer in terms of integration possibilities;
47 “Asylum Statistics 2016”, Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asy 
lum_statistics [accessed: 8.02.2017].
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In 2015, 247 individual programmes were provided for refugees, some 
of which had already started in 2014. The appointment of IPIs (considering the 
number of families) was as follows:
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4) Practical information on everyday life (e.g., the procedure of renting 
an apartment);
5) Information on migrants’ laws and obligations.48
The programme was supposed to be fully implemented in 2015. By 2014 it 
had already been assessed as partially implemented.
3.2.4.2. Shortcomings of Polish Integration Policy
The need to develop Polish integration policy has been noted, especially 
following its accession to the EU; however the integration mechanisms that 
have been proposed seem inefficient and still lack consistency. The already cited 
MIPEX 2015 report and Poland’s rank indicate that the Polish must still be 
redefined and improved. In 2012, a catalogue of recommendations for both 
Polish migration and integration policy was introduced. The recommendations 
recognized the need for developing integration mechanisms for migrants who 
are not under international protection, especially in terms of their difficulties 
in finding employment, mostly due to low qualifications. Other aspects and re-
commendations concerned:
1) Further developing pre-integration programmes;
2) Instituting a more harmonious process of passing from pre-integra-
tion to integration;
3) Introducing mentors as additional assistance to migrants;
4) Strengthening the role of NGOs in the integration process.49
These areas mentioned in the Council of Ministers document are consen-
sual with the major flaws of the Polish integration system listed in the MIPEX 
report. These are labour market mobility, education, health and political par-
ticipation. The main accusation is concerned with the fact that general sup-
port in Poland for non-EU newcomers is the third weakest of all the examined 
countries. Another problem is poor access to vocational training or education 
for migrants – only 12% of working age migrants took any courses.50
The major gap in the Polish integration system seems to be the lack of sup-
port for migrants trying to access accommodation. A lot still needs to be done 
in this area. Most refugees decide to remain in cities where reception centres 
are located after the process is completed. These locations have often limited 
possibilities for accommodation provision in terms of community resources. 
48 MPiPS, Polska polityka integracji…, p. 21. 
49 “Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działanie, Dokument przyjęty przez Radę 
Ministrów w dniu 31 lipca 2012 r.”, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Warszawa 2012.
50 “Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015”...
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A good practice has been introduced in Warsaw, where five premises per year are 
dedicated to persons under international protection.51 Taking into considera-
tion the fact that there are still not high numbers of refugees coming Poland, 
this solution seems to be a good practice worth copying in other communities. 
Another significant problem of the integration system is the availability 
of an educational system for migrants. The key regulation is the Ordinance 
of the Minister for National Education enacted in 2010. It concerns the rules 
of accepting migrants without Polish citizenship into kindergartens, schools, 
additional language education, etc.52 The proposed facilities concern the po-
ssibility of accepting migrant children into schools without any certificates 
or other documents confirming their obtained education. It also clarifies that 
the system of Polish language teaching should complement the education sys-
tem. This additional teaching lasts no longer than 12 months. Additionally, 
the Ordinance enables the provision of classes in refugees’ native languages, 
as well as culture education. Since 2010, it has become possible to employ 
teaching assistants who speak the refugees’ languages. However, this practice 
is still rather rare – of all of the country’s assistants, only several are employed 
for this purpose and mostly by NGOs.53
3.3. Public Attitude 
(Robert Łoś)
Migration means the permanent or temporary abandonment of a person, 
group or even a whole society of their permanent residence and their moving 
to another place.54 It is often common for this new place of residence to be cha-
racterized by the significant cultural diversity of the local society. Culture can 
be defined in various ways55: technical and consumer (production, consump-
tion and exchange), language, customs, art, science and education, politico-le-
gal, social awareness, religion, etc. 
Migrants import at least certain elements of their native culture, which re-
sults in intensive social interactions. Such interactions then result the creation 
51 MPiPS, Polska polityka integracji…, p. 11.
52 Dz.U. z 2010 r., Nr. 57, poz. 361, Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 1 kwietnia 2010, 
Warszawa 2010.
53 MPiPS, Polska polityka integracji…, p. 15.
54 P. Kraszewski, “Typologia migracji”, [in:] Migracja – Europa – Polska, eds W.J. Burszta, J. Serwański, 
Poznań 2003, p. 11.
55 W.J. Burszta, M. Januszkiewicz, “Słowo wstępne: kłopot zwany kulturoznawstwem”, [in:] Kultu- 
roznawstwo: dyscyplina bez dyscypliny?, eds W.J. Burszta, M. Januszkiewicz, Warszawa 2010, p. 8; R. Zende- 
rowski, K. Cebul, M. Krycki, Międzynarodowe stosunki kulturalne, Warszawa 2010, p. 313; J. Kmita, 
O kulturze symbolicznej, Warszawa, Centralny Ośrodek Metodyki Upowszechniania Kultury, 1982, p. 72.
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of opinions of migrants, according to which cultural aspects, as well as econo-
mic ones, are key in assessing foreigners.56
For migrants, adjusting to living in new conditions is not easy, especially 
in terms of accepting social behavioural models and culture in its broadest sense. 
Foreigners, when in contact with a new society, can adopt different attitudes le-
ading to assimilation, integration, marginalization or separation.57 The first two 
scenarios of behaviour are the most beneficial for both migrants and the receiving 
country. When the adjustment process progresses too slowly, the migrant risks 
marginalization and separation from the local community. Migrants are not part 
of social life as a result, and the mutual reluctance of migrants and the receiving 
society to interact is deepening.58 In migrant groups. all of the above-mentioned 
models of behaviour can be observed in most of countries around the world.59
Taking into consideration the broad possibilities of free movement, mi-
grants can freely travel between their home country and the receiving country. 
In sustaining contact with their home country, they create a specific cultural 
and economic bridges. It enables them to feel at home in the receiving country 
without losing their own national identity and distinctiveness.
Not without meaning are the strategies adopted by certain states, determi-
ning the type of behaviour adopted by these states and their policies concerning 
migrants. They are often described as melting pot, multiculturalism, exclu-
sion or segregation.60 The first two strategies treat migrants as future members 
of the community, actively participating in the cultural and social life of the re-
ceiving society.
Since Poland has a homogenous population – according to Eurostat data 
from 2015 in Poland, the country has the lowest percentage of non-nationals 
in its resident population61 – the state has not been concerned with migration 
or integration policy to a great extent. However, the recent migration crisis evo-
56 T. Hammar, Democracy and the Nation State. Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in World of International 
Migration, Aldershot 1990, pp. 23–24. 
57 J.W. Berry, “Conceptual Approaches to Acculturation”, [in:] Acculturation. Advances in Theory, 
Measurement and Applied Research, eds K.W. Chun, P.M. Organista, G. Marin, Washington, American 
Psychological Association, 2003, pp. 17–37.
58 A. Chodubski, “Migracje i imigranci a współczesne przemiany europejskie”, [in:] Integracja kul- 
turowa imigrantów. Wyzwania i dylematy, ed. J. Balicki, Warszawa, Fundacja Konrada Adenauera, 2007, 
pp. 103–121; J. Grabowska-Luzińska, M. Sokólski, op. cit.; J. Balicki, Imigranci i uchodźcy w Unii Euro- 
pejskiej. Humanizacja polityki imigracyjnej i azylowej, Warszawa 2012.
59 M. Skoczek, “Imigranci w społeczeństwach przyjmujących: izolacja i marginalizacja”, [in:] Imigranci 
i społeczeństwa przyjmujące. Adaptacja? Integracja? Transformacja?, ed. Zamojski, J., Warszawa 2000, pp. 7–13.
60 A. Banasewicz, “Konsekwencje demograficzne i społeczne imigracji do krajów OECD”, [in:] ibi- 
dem; Z. Kawczyńska-Butrym, Migracje. Wybrane zagadnienia, Lublin 2009.




ked new discussions concerning on the possibility of migrants coming to Po-
land. At this time, the rather negative attitudes of Poles towards migrants and 
foreigners in general became visible. 
The reasons for this are manifold – beginning with the period of Commu-
nist rule, which imposed restricted border controls on Poland. The possibility 
of free movement was significantly restricted; therefore, migrants coming to Po- 
land mostly came from other states in the Soviet Bloc. After World War II, 
Poland did not accept refugees and it was not a signatory of the Geneva 
Convention of 1951 nor the New York Protocol of 1967.62 While other We-
stern European societies became ethnically diverse (also due to their colonial 
past) and more familiar with both multicultural societies and possible methods 
of dealing with this new phenomenon, Poland and other V4 states remained ra-
ther hermetic.63 Immigration was mostly limited to migrants from other frien-
dly countries also under Soviet influence.64 This was a significant reason for the 
visible differences not only within the legal framework for migration policy 
in Western and Eastern Europe, but also in emotional attitudes towards and 
perceptions of migrants. Poland, after 1989 had to rapidly change its legal sys-
tem in terms of migration and asylum. What is more, day by day, Poland has 
changed from a hermetic and closed state to an open one. Nevertheless, mass 
migration has never seemed to be a problem for Poland, as it is not perceived as 
a settlement country or even a longstanding destination.65
Concerning the various above-mentioned determinants, Polish society can 
be defined as less tolerant of migrants, especially those from distant countries, 
where racial and cultural differences are particularly evident. As the migrant 
population is not numerous in Poland, racial identity is a significant issue. Sta-
tes with large diasporas, like the USA for example, seem to have a more favo-
urable attitude towards and a wider acceptance of foreigners.66 What is more, 
from Africa in particular face difficulties with integrating into Polish society, 
as their racial distinctiveness is visible. According to Maciej Ząbek they “(…) 
are generally perceived as foreign even if they have been living in Poland for 
over thirty years or were born here. Particularly when there are so few Africans 
62 S. Łodziński, “Refugees in Poland. Mechanisms of Ethnic Exclusion”, International Journal of Socio- 
logy, Fall 2009, Vol. 39, No. 3, p. 81.
63 M. Okólski, European Immigrations: Trends, Structures and Policy Implications, Amsterdam 2012.
64 A. Grzymała-Kazłowska, “Clashes of Discourse: The Representations of Immigrants in Poland”, 
Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 2009, Vol. 7, pp. 58–81, http://www.tandfonline.com.taylor-
francis.han3.lib.uni.lodz.pl/doi/full/10.1080/15562940802687272 [accessed: 13.02.2017].
65 Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015”, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Indicators-of-
Immigrant-Integration-2015.pdf [accessed: 13.02.2017].
66 M. Ząbek, “Africans in Poland. Race Relations in Contemporary Polish Society’, International 
Journal of Sociology, Fall 2009, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 68–69.
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living in Poland today, the ones who do live here are all the more noticeable, 
and constantly feel as though they are on public display, attracting the noti-
ce of passers-by and being pointed at, even in big cities.”67 The Polish intole-
rance of and negative attitudes towards migrants were not of such importance 
until the recent migrant crisis. Xenophobic attitudes were bolstered as a result 
and nationalist groups came into being.
In June 2015 and September 2016, a survey was conducted aiming to exa-
mine the attitudes of Poles towards migrants. The respondents were asked 
questions concerning certain nationalities: Ukrainians, Vietnamese, citizens 
of Western European countries, North Americans, Canadians, citizens of Afri-
can countries and Arabs.68
In the survey, several questions were asked, concerning the cultural proximi-
ty of the examined nationalities, among others.
Figure 3.2
Assessment of the Cultural Proximity of Certain Ethnic Groups  
from the Polish Perspective in 2015
Source: own research, based on: Badanie na temat postaw wobec 
cudzoziemców w Polsce, IPSOS for IOM, Warszawa 2015; Badanie na temat 
postaw wobec cudzoziemcóww Polsce, IPSOS for IOM, Warszawa 2016.
In 2015 citizens of Western European countries were perceived as being the 
most culturally similar to Poles (61% of positive responses), with Americans and 
Canadians in second place (48%) and Ukrainians in third (47%). The ethnic 
groups considered to be the most culturally distant from Poles were Arabs 
(12%), Africans (14%) and Vietnamese (also 14%).
67 Ibidem, p. 74. 
68 “Badanie na temat postaw wobec cudzoziemców, Warszawa, czerwiec 2015 i wrzesień 2016”, 
www.iom.pl [accessed: 13.02.2017].
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The study was repeated a year later and the results turned out slightly diffe-
rently. The general positive perception of Western European countries, the USA 
and Canadians remained stable; however the percentage of respondents perce-
iving Arabs as culturally similar decreased. It was especially visible in the group 
that had direct contact with migrants – only 3% of them thought that their cul-
ture was close to Polish culture, compared with 10% in the previous year. 
Figure 3.3
Assessment of Cultural Proximity in 2016
Source: own research, based on: ibidem.
Figure 3.4
Positive Assessment of Foreigners in Terms of Trust in 2015
Source: own research, based on: ibidem.
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Source: own research, based on: ibidem.
Figure 3.4
Positive Assessment of Foreigners in Terms of Trust in 2015
Source: own research, based on: ibidem.
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As well as an examination of cultural proximity, questions concerning trust 
also came up in the survey. The results of these questions seemed to corre-
spond with general perceptions of cultural similarity – both Arabs and Africans 
seem to be the least trusted ethnic groups in Poland. Comparing the results 
from 2015 and 2016, it is visible that cultural distance goes hand in hand with 
a lack of trust – in 2015, 23% of respondents declared their trust in Arabs, 
while in 2016 only 9% of them did. However, it is interesting to note that the 
Vietnamese population, which is perceived as culturally distant to Polish culture, 
actually evokes rather positive connotations. This decline directly results from 
the migration crisis, and both Europeans and Poles are mostly afraid of the ra-
pidly growing Muslim diasporas in Europe. 
Figure 3.5
Positive Assessment of Foreigners in Terms of Trust in 2016
Source: own research, based on: ibidem.
One of the most significant questions asked by the survey concerned possible 
threats posed by migrants to state security, as migrants are often accused of ter-
rorism, delinquency, smuggling, drugs dealing, participating in the illegal arms 
trade, human trafficking and causing social and religious conflict.69 Opinions 
from the 2015 and 2016 surveys show that these concerns are connected mostly 
with Arabs; negative perceptions in this regard grew by 15% age points from 
2015 to 2016 and reached 73%. Also, when considering the African population 
we can also observe a growth in anxiety, however not to such a great extent. 
69 B.R. Barber, Dżihad kontra McŚwiat, Warszawa 2000, p. 25; M. Golko, Cywilizacja. Europa. 
Globalizacja, Poznań 1999, p. 155.
171
Figure 3.6
Polish Opinions of Foreigners in Terms of Their Threat  
to Poland’s Security, 2015
Source: own research, based on: ibidem.
Figure 3.7
Polish Opinions of Foreigners in Terms of Their Threat  
to Poland’s Security, 2016
Source: own research, based on: ibidem.
Accepting foreigners means the introduction of new cultural elements into 
the receiving society, which can have both advantages and disadvantages. Immi-
grants contribute both material and spiritual values to the receiving society.The 
former value contains, among others, architecture, clothing and cuisine. The lat-
ter comprises beliefs, religious rituals, customs, lifestyles and family patterns.70
70 K. Arrow, “The Theory of Discrimination”, Working Papers, Princeton University 1971, No. 403, 
pp. 21–37. 
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As long as these values do not collide significantly with the dominant so-
ciety, the coexistence of different cultures can have a positive and enriching 
effect. However, when these values are too contradictory, the migrant society 
is the one that loses more. When talking about advantages and disadvantages, 
it can be said that the country accepting migrant cultures can profit from such 
diversity.71 Nowadays, it can frequently be observed that foreign cultures can 
endure even far from their place of origin, even if the receiving country does 
not provide any king of legal assistance allowing the recognition of ethnical and 
cultural differences.72
The migration crisis has inspired a change of attitudes towards migrants 
and foreigners in general, which is evident from the change in the percentage 
of negative opinions, especially concerning migrants from African and Arab 
countries. Migrants are assessed rather negatively in terms of their influence 
on Polish culture. This also derives from globalization, with European regio-
nalism voicing the fear that excessive universalism will lead to the dusk of We-
stern culture. The indicator of the negative influence of migrants on Polish cul-
ture increased by seven percentage points between 2015 and 2016. An even 
more radical change can be observed in the positive perception of the influence 
of migrants on Polish culture – the indicator decreased from 26% in 2015 to 
only 10% in 2016. 
Figure 3.8
Opinions on the Influence of Foreigners on Domestic Culture 
Source: own research, based on: ibidem.
71 K. Boski, J. Fons, R. Wijver, A.M. Chodnicka, New Directions in Cross-cultural Psychology, War- 
szawa 2002.
72 A. Górny, “Multiple citizenship in Poland”, CMR Working Papers, Warszawa 2003, No. 53, pp. 56–70.
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When talking about migrants, we can observe different anxieties surro-
unding their potential destructive influence on the receiving society. Among 
them, we can name social pathologies, begging, being in conflict with social 
values and norms, generating conflicts and social unrest and difficulties in ada-
pting to changing social and civilizational reality.73
Therefore, taking into consideration the above facts, both concerning the 
influence of history and past experiences of Soviet rule in Poland and the cur-
rent migration crisis, we can issue the following conclusions:
1) Civilization and cultural differences are not decisive in the positive 
or negative assessment and perception of foreigners, since the Vietna-
mese, in spite of being perceived as culturally different to Poles, were 
assessed rather positively
2) However, the current international situation and general circumstan-
ces have had a significant impact on the way foreign-born populations 
are being seen. This is a valid conclusion when considering the period 
of Communist rule in Poland, which led to the creation of a closed and 
hermetic country with almost no foreign-born population. Furthermo-
re, when considering the migration crisis, opinions have also been for-
med by repetitive terrorist attacks and incidents involving migrants.
3.4. Political Implitacions 
(Anna Kobierecka, Michał Kobierecki)
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the issue of the Polish political party 
system in the light of the European migration crisis. Issues related to the migra-
tion crisis and migration policy in the programmes of political parties seemed 
to have a significant impact on the 2015 Polish parliamentary elections. To-
gether with the intensification of refugee inflows into Europe, more frequent 
incidents motivated by ethnic differences and the growing frustration of re-
ceiving societies, political discourse on migration and its threats gained much 
attention. The fact that the Polish parliamentary elections took place in Octo-
ber 2015 had a natural impact on the relevance of the migration crisis for the 
shape of the Polish political party system.
Poland, as an EU member state, faced the threat of the imposition of cer-
tain regulations for the resolution of the migration crisis, such as refugee 
73 A. Chodubski, “Wartości współczesnego życia kulturowego. Tożsamość Polaków w rzeczywistości 
diasporalnej”, [in:] Wspólne drogi Polaków w kraju i na obczyźnie (1918–2008), eds L. Kacprzak, M. Szczer- 
biński, Piła, Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne 2009, pp. 375–389.
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quotas for all EU member states. Poland, together with the other V4 coun-
tries, opposed this idea; however, the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe [Civic Plat-
form-Polish People’s Party, PSL] government, afraid of isolation and its lack of 
influence on the decision-making process in tackling the crisis, decided in the 
end to back the plan.74 However, two months later the government was over-
taken by the conservative and Eurosceptic Law and Justice Party, which had 
already loudly voiced its standpoint regarding the migration crisis during the 
election campaign; this prominently influenced Poland’s response to new po-
tential threats deriving from intensified migration. What is more, no left-wing 
parties exceeded the threshold needed to be elected to the Polish Sejm, where-
as two newly-established political formations succeeded in winning mandates. 
It is therefore indisputable that the Polish party system has been transformed.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the reasons why the Polish par-
ty system changed so significantly after the 2015 parliamentary elections. 
Not only did new formations enter the Parliament at the expense of left-wing 
parties, but also the Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Platform, PO] lost to Law 
and Justice for the first time in eight years, meaning that the latter was able to 
form a government independently. This research will make an attempt to verify 
a hypothesis stating that attitude of Polish political parties to the migration cri-
sis has affected the party system in Poland. It will also attempt to answer a re-
search question concerning the reasons for Civic Platform’s standpoint on the 
refugee crisis. 
In order to conduct this research, it was essential to determine the attitude 
of the analysed parties (present in the Sejm of the seventh and eighth terms) 
towards accepting migrants in Poland. These attitudes were not present in the 
official political programmes of the respective parties, so the statements of key 
politicians affiliated to the respective parties had to be considered. The only 
exception refers to the PO and PSL before the 2015 elections, as their stand-
point could be assessed based on the decisions of their government, although 
of course this has been additionally verified by statements from key politi-
cians. The results were then examined in conjunction with the number of se-
ats that the analysed parties occupied in the Sejm before and after the elections 
– the pre-election figures have been based on the number of members of the 
respective parliamentary groups, while the post-election figures are based on 
its results. 




3.4.1. Polish Political Parties before the 2015 Elections
At first sight, the Polish party system could be perceived as stable, as two 
dominant parties can be named – Civic Platform and Law and Justice. Howe-
ver, the Polish electorate seems to be floating and uncertain as, since 1989, one 
party has ruled twice in a row only once. The current internal and external situ-
ation is affecting the electorate and its voting decisions. Since Central-Eastern 
European societies exhibit a stronger intolerance of and a greater hesitance to-
wards foreigners, it is not surprising that the whole V4 area reacted strongly 
to the ongoing migration crisis. In a survey conducted in Poland in 2015 by 
IPSOS for the International Organization for Migration, 22% of respondents 
claimed that they perceive Arabs as friendly, while 65% claimed that their atti-
tude towards Arabs was negative. What is more, 56% of respondents perceived 
Arabs as a threat to Polish security.75 These survey outcomes are evidence of 
the significance and meaning of a political party’s view of migration in the eyes 
of the potential electorate.
The issue of migration was indirectly discussed on the occasion of the Po-
lish accession to the European Union. While some older member states con-
centrated on safeguarding their labour markets, the Polish government voiced 
its concern regarding the possibilities of the unlimited right to purchase land. 
Therefore, the Polish delegation negotiated adequate restrictions limiting the-
se rights for foreigners. This also highlights Poland’s natural, primal and rather 
negative attitude towards foreigners, and the fear of their potential growing 
influence in Poland.
Polish society, until now, could be considered as homogenous – the percenta-
ge of immigrants and the native-born offspring of immigrants is less than 5%.76 
According to Eurostat, only 1% of the Polish population was born abroad.77 
What is more, Poland is classified as country with an immigrant population 
shaped by border changes or national minorities. This means that, until the re-
cent migration crisis, it has not faced any critical or grave threats from ethnic 
diversity78. Nevertheless, during most recent campaign, owing to specific cir-
cumstances and the rapidly growing numbers of refugees seeking protection 
in Europe, the issue of migration became an important part of the struggle for 
political power between the most significant political parties. The migration 
75 “Badanie na temat postaw wobec cudzoziemców w Polsce”, IPSOS, Warszawa 2015.
76 “Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015. Settling in”, OECD. 
77 “Five main citizenships of (non-EU) asylum applicants, 2015 (number of first time applicants, 
rounded figures)”, Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Five_main_
citizenships_of_(non-EU)_asylum_applicants,_2015_(number_of_first_time_applicants_rounded_
figures)_YB16.png [accessed: 13.12.2016]. 
78 “Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015. Settling in”, OECD.
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crisis also resulted in visible divisions and the weakening of the European Union 
as an organization, which additionally exacerbated the discussion of these issues 
in the Polish parliamentary elections. 
The European migrant crisis has been on the agenda since April 2015, when 
five boats with almost 2,000 migrants on board sank on their way to Europe. 
More than 1,200 people died. The crisis itself is associated with a rapid rise 
in the number of immigrants arriving in the European Union, who are a com-
bination of economic migrants and refugees. Their great number is a result 
of certain ongoing conflicts in countries in North Africa and the Middle East.79 
The growing number of migrants in certain EU countries such as Italy and Gre-
ece, which lie along migrant routes, forced the European Union to act in order 
to stabilize the situation. 
The relocation of refugees and migrants appeared to be the answer to the 
issue. The European Council decided in September 2015 to transfer migrants 
from the most affected states as part of the emergency relocation scheme ba-
sed on the percentage of member states per quota.80 However, the much-de-
bated compulsory quota system revealed differences between member states.81 
The decision to relocate 120,000 refugees was made by voting. Most EU mem-
ber states supported the solution, including Poland. Only the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Romania were against the relocation, while Finland 
abstained from voting. It was widely discussed that the Polish government had 
abandoned its V4 allies.82 According to Polish ministers, voting against the de-
cision was senseless because of the vote distribution. According to the Deputy 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Rafał Trzaskowski, opposing the decision would 
only have led to Poland’s having less influence on the final outcome.83
The decision of the Polish government to support the European Union’s po-
sition on the relocation of migrants in the light of the refugee crisis symbolized 
a clear division between Polish political parties on this issue, which was reflec-
ted by the party system in Poland. The political landscape in Poland since 2005 
has been dominated by two major parties, namely Civic Platform and Law and 
Justice. The PiS government ruled Poland between 2005 and 2007, but as a re-
sult of the breakup of a coalition with the populist Liga Polskich Rodzin [League 
79  R.M. Townsend, The European Migrant Crisis, 2015, p. 1.
80 R. Samaddar, A Post-Colonial Enquiry into Europe’s Debt and Migration Crisis, Kolkata 2016, p. 110.
81 L. Radu, “More or Less Europe? The European Leaders’ Discourses on the Refugee Crisis”, 
Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations, July 2016, Vol. 18, No. 2 (38), p. 22.
82 “UE podzieliła uchodźców, było głosowanie. Cztery kraje przeciwko, Polska jak większość”, 22 Sep- 
tember 2015, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/szefowie-unijnych-msw-uzgodnili-podzial-
uchodzcow,579199.html [accessed: 13.12.2016].
83 “UE przegłosowała decyzję o podziale imigrantów. Polska cofnęła swój sprzeciw”, 22 Septem- 
ber 2015, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1509225,UE-przeglosowala-decyzje-o-podziale-imigra 
ntow-Polska-cofnela-swoj-sprzeciw [accessed: 13.12.2016].
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of Polish Families, LPR] and Samoobrona [Self Defence] and its inability to go-
vern independently, it decided to hold early elections, which were eventually 
won by PO, which formed a coalition with the agricultural Polish People’s Par-
ty. This coalition was the first in post-Communist Poland’s history to continue 
in power for two consecutive four-year terms. In 2015, however, PiS won by 
a significant margin and was able to rule the country without a coalition part-
ner. It is a similar story for Polish presidents. Since 2005 only PiS and PO 
members have been elected: consecutively, Lech Kaczyński (PiS), Bronisław 
Komorowski (PO) and Andrzej Duda (PiS). Therefore, it appears legitimate to 
claim that the Polish party system is a competition between PO and PiS, with 
other parties playing a rather modest role, or at least it has been so far. 
PiS and PO have contrasting opinions on a number of relevant issues. 
In this context, the fact that they were supposed to build a coalition toge-
ther after the 2005 parliamentary elections appears surprising. Law and Justi-
ce is usually regarded as a conservative party. In its programme, there are sta-
tements about rejecting political correctness and the erosion of independence 
of EU member states; supporting the diversity of Europe is thus against unifica-
tion. Law and Justice believes that Polish decision-makers have led the country 
to lose the tools to independently realize its national interests.84 Economically, 
PiS supports the idea of the state playing an active role.85 In its programme, it 
also criticizes the post-Communist development of Poland, both pre-2005 and 
post-2007 – the latter period is described as “Tusk’s system”86 in reference to 
former Prime Minister and PO leader Donald Tusk.
The attitude of Law and Justice to accepting migrants in Poland was not re-
vealed in its political programme. Still, it could be derived from speeches and 
declarations made by politicians in this party. Generally, the party has been 
much more reserved on the issue of welcoming refugees. As PiS spokesperson 
Elżbieta Witek said in July 2015, the government should take care of Poles 
living in Eastern, post-Soviet countries rather than accept migrants from other 
countries.87 The party also expressed the view that Poland should engage in co-
unteracting the reasons for the migrant crisis, such as the operations of ISIS 
in the Middle East, rather than reacting to its results.88 PiS leader Jarosław 
84 “Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014”, Warszawa 2014, p. 12–13, 149, http://pis.org.pl/doku 
menty [accessed: 14.12.2016].
85 Ibidem, p. 14. 
86 Ibidem, p. 43.
87 “Choroba terroryzmu? PO i PiS o przyjmowaniu uchodźców”, 20 July 2015, http://wiadomosci.
dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/495707,choroba-terroryzmu-po-i-pis-o-przyjmowaniu-uchodzcow.html 
[accessed: 15.12.2016].
88 G. Osiecki, “PO i PIS jednym głosem w sprawie imigrantów. Decyzje dopiero po wyborach”, 
1 September 2015, http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/891340,po-i-pis-jednym-glosem-w-sprawie-imi 
grantow-decyzje-dopiero-po-wyborach.html [accessed: 15.12.2016].
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of Polish Families, LPR] and Samoobrona [Self Defence] and its inability to go-
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Kaczyński pointed out during a debate in the Polish Parliament that accepting 
even a small number of migrants could initiate the process of more migrants 
coming to Poland who do not abide by Polish law and practices.89 Although 
this has not been said directly, generally PiS has embodied a sceptical view 
of accepting migrants. 
In the Polish political landscape, Civic Platform appears to have more liberal 
views of certain issues. PO was a ruling party between 2007 and 2015, along-
side PSL. During this period, the Polish government pursued a pro-Europe-
an policy, which resulted the appointment of the party’s members and former 
Polish prime ministers to important European positions: Jerzy Buzek became 
President of the European Parliament between 2009 and 2012, while Donald 
Tusk has been President of the European Council since 2014. Under PO leader-
ship, Poland was praised in the West for maintaining economic development de-
spite the financial crisis and for its skilful diplomacy as part of the EU. This al-
lowed the Polish government to achieve important goals in its European policy, 
namely expanding the Union’s budget and being exempted from climate rules.90
This pro-European attitude from PO could also be seen when the Polish 
government was facing the challenge of the European migration crisis. In con-
trast to many other EU member states, Poland, under the leadership of PO 
and PSL, was more reluctant to accept migrants, but retained the position that 
decisions should be taken voluntarily by member states, even if it was willing 
to help at the same time.91 Generally, PO found itself in a difficult situation. 
On the one hand, it was asked by the Eurocrats to engage more, as Poland had 
benefited so excessively from the Eurofund, but on the other hand it was aware 
of the Polish population’s attitudes towards accepting migrants. According to 
one of the surveys, two-thirds of Poles share a negative attitude towards immi-
grants. This was a great problem in the 2015 parliamentary elections.92
Differences in the attitudes of the major political parties on the issue of re-
locating migrants was clearly visible during the debate in the Polish Sejm on 
16 September 2015. Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz said during her speech that 
“turning our backs on those who need help in the European family morally and 
89 “Kaczyński przeciwny przyjęciu imigrantów. Ostrzega przed szariatem: Czy tego chcecie?”, 
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Them”, The Guardian, 2 July 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/poles-dont-want-
immigrants-they-dont-understand-them-dont-like-them [accessed: 15.12.2016].
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mentally leavingthis community”. She also stressed that EU membership obli-
ges Poland to undertake certain activities. The Prime Minister added that the 
Parliament had to decide between the credibility of Poland and the actual fe-
ars of Poles, and that responsibility and common sense must reign. PiS leader 
Jarosław Kaczyński responded by asking the question of whether the govern-
ment “has the right to make decisions under external pressure and without the 
nation’s acceptance, which may very probably have a negative effect on our li-
ves, everyday reality, public life, public space, the actual sphere of freedom and 
finally, our safety”.93 Both of these speeches directly expressed the attitudes 
of both parties attitude towards the issue of accepting migrants and refugees, 
with PO being for, and PiS being against. The upcoming parliamentary elec-
tions made the situation even harder for the ruling party, thus giving Law and 
Justice extra opportunities to gain new voters.
The government’s decisions on the migration crisis appear to reflect this 
discrepancy. As was noted earlier, the Polish government supported the idea of 
relocating immigrants in the European Union, siding with the majority despite 
generally being against it, although it opposed the mandatory quotas imposed 
by the European Commission. As Minister of the Interior Teresa Piotrowska 
said, “we are prepared to accept migrants but not quotas”.94 Already in August 
2015, Prime Minister Kopacz declared that the country would consider ac-
cepting more migrants than the 2,000 previously declared within the next two 
years, but realistically it could not offer a very high level of refugee welfare se-
rvices.95 As Kopacz said, “Poland will accept refugees, not immigrants. As many 
as we can afford: not one more, nor less”.96 Therefore, even though support for 
the EU’s decisions on relocating migrants might have been unpopular in Po-
land, the PO-PSL government was apparently trying to manoeuvre between its 
responsibilities to other EU member states and Polish public opinion, which 
was, as has been stated, rather lukewarm on the topic of hosting migrants. 
During the seventh term of the Polish Sejm, apart from Civic Platform 
and Law and Justice, three other political parties were present in Parliament: 
93 “Specjalne posiedzenie Sejmu w sprawie uchodźców. Cała Europa obserwuje co się dzieje w pol- 
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Ruch Palikota [the Palikot Movement], later renamed Twój Ruch [Your Move-
ment], the Polish People’s Party (PSL) and Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej [the 
Democratic Left Alliance, SLD]. PSL was a member of the government coali-
tion, so its position may have been at least to some extent associated with the 
government’s stand. PSL politicians discussed the issue of accepting migrants 
in a balanced way. For example, the PSL leader and Polish Vice-Prime Mini-
ster, Janusz Piechociński, declared that he believed that a nationwide debate 
was needed concerning the immigrant issue,97 while MP Piotr Zgorzelski dec-
lared that PSL’s position was that Poland could accept those in need, but that 
they could only stay on Polish terms.98
SLD and Twój Ruch (the new name of Ruch Palikota) were rather to the left 
of the Polish political landscape, and formed an electoral coalition before the 
2015 elections. Both parties generally expressed a rather pro-European attitu-
de. Similarly, their representatives did not express that they were against accep-
ting migrants. The leader of Twój Ruch, Janusz Palikot, said in an interview that 
the Polish government should try to limit the number of immigrants arriving in 
Poland “because we are a poor country”, although did not directly say that he 
was against accepting migrants.99 The coalition’s candidate Barbara Nowacka, 
who became Prime Minister, declared unambiguously in an interview that re-
fugees should be accepted.100
A review of the standpoint on the migration crisis of the parties that were 
members of the seventh term of the Sejm revealed three general positions. 
PO and its coalition partner, PSL, appeared to be balancing between pressure 
from the European Union and Polish society’s sceptical attitude towards accep-
ting migrants. The more conservative PiS, although it never claimed unequ-
ivocally that it was against letting refugees to Poland, consequently remained 
reserved, raising fears and pointing to the government’s subservience to the 
European Union. Left-wing parties (SLD, the Palikot Movement), which ge-
97  “Janusz Piechociński chce wielkiej debaty w sprawie imigrantów”, 8 September 2015, http://
wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/499916,pomysl-wicepremiera-janusza-piechocinskiego-na-
imigrantow-lider-psl-chce-wielkiej-debaty.html [15.12.2016].
98 “Zgorzelski: nam zalew emigracji nie grozi, będziemy co najwyżej krajem tranzytowym”, 17 Sep- 
tember 2015, http://www.tvp.info/21668890/zgorzelski-nam-zalew-emigracji-nie-grozi-bedziemy-co-naj 
wyzej-krajem-tranzytowym [accessed: 15.09.2016)].
99 “Janusz Palikot o przyjmowaniu imigrantów: na pewno nie można wpuszczać każdego”, 17 Sep- 
tember 2015, http://www.polskieradio.pl/7/129/Artykul/1505991,Janusz-Palikot-o-przyjmowaniu-imi 
grantow-na-pewno-nie-mozna-wpuszczac-kazdego [accessed 15.12.2016].
100 D. Grzędziński, “Barbara Nowacka, ‘Uchodźców należy przyjąć. Nie ma co gdybać o odsetku 
terrorystów’”, 21 September 2015, http://www.polskatimes.pl/artykul/8169792,barbara-nowacka-uchodz 
cow-nalezy-przyjac-nie-ma-co-gdybac-o-odsetku-terrorystow,id,t.html [accessed: 15.12.2016].
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nerally have the most liberal world view of all Polish parties, appeared much 
more open to accepting migrants, raising economic reasons (if any) limiting the 
number of people to be relocated to Poland. 
3.4.2. Polish Political Parties after the 2015 Elections
The 2015 parliamentary elections in Poland led to a vast change of the Po-
lish political landscape. Civic Platform lost its leading position to Law and Ju-
stice, which gained a majority allowing it to create a government without the 
need to find a coalition partner. Left-wing parties that went into the elections 
as a coalition failed to exceed the 8% threshold and were not elected into Par-
liament, while two new parties were – Nowoczesna [Modern] led by economist 
Ryszard Petru and a political movement called Kukiz’15, formed by former 
musician Paweł Kukiz. The distribution of the mandates in the Sejm after the 
2015 elections are shown in Figure 3.9.
It is important to determine what the attitude of the new parties in parlia-
ment was towards the migration crisis. Nowoczesna’s standpoint was rather po-
sitive towards accepting migrants, but is hard to be assessed this explicitly. First 
of all, it is a new political party formed before the previous elections. Secon-
dly, the assessment of its attitude towards migration crisis is complicated as its 
stand on the issue is floating. Nowoczesna does not directly refer to migration 
issues in its programme, only containing the statement that: “the European 
Union should effectively counteract terrorism, secure its borders and develop 
common migration and asylum policies.”101 The only way to understand the 
opinion of Nowoczesna’s members regarding migration is to analyse their offi-
cial statements to the media. The leader of Nowoczesna, Ryszard Petru, kept his 
tone on the migration crisis rather moderate before the parliamentary elections, 
saying in an interview in September 2015 that refugees “need to be accepted 
(…) but wisely, which will eliminate the risk of terrorists coming to Poland”. 
In the same interview he also highlighted that “the doubts of Poles concerning 
migrants should be understood, but at the same time it should be observed that 
Poland is obliged to respect international conventions”.102 More than a year la-
ter, in November 2016, his attitude towards migration crisis had changed signi-
ficantly, as in his appearance on Polsat News, he admitted that too many refu-
gees had been accepted in Europe and that the problem should be solved at its 
root by sealing borders and accepting only refugees, not all migrants.103
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101 “Program. Nowoczesna Polska dla każdego”, https://nowoczesna.org/program/ [accessed: 21.11.2016].
102 “Ryszard Petru: Angela Merkel popełniła błąd, a my ws. uchodźców nie mamy jednego stanowiska”, 
wpolityce.pl [accessed: 21.09.2015]. 
103 “Petru: przyjęto zbyt dużo uchodźców”, Polsat News [accessed: 21.11.2016]. 
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Another new party that managed to enter the Polish Parliament is Kukiz’15. 
In this case, similarly to Nowoczesna, the issue of the migration crisis was not 
officially discussed in its programme, therefore it can only be investigated on 
the basis of official statements made by its members. In the proposed program-
me, it can be read that: “(…) we refuse to renounce sovereignty and to pass 
our government’s competences to Europe. Our government will guarantee the 
realization of Polish national interests in foreign policy. Our government will 
only take care of Polish interests, instead of German, Russian, Ukrainian or Eu-
ropean interests”.104 This statement suggests that the standpoint of this political 
party on the migration crisis (only willing to take Polish interests into conside-
ration without any recognition of international commitments, especially those 
to Europe) can be perceived as equal to negating any forms of European coope-
ration on developing joint solutions to the migration crisis. Official statements 
to the media are proof of this assumption. From very moment of forming it, 
Paweł Kukiz, the movement’s leader, did not hide his negative attitude towards 
104 “Strategia zmiany”, Kukiz’15, http://ruchkukiza.pl/content/uploads/2016/04/Strategia-Zmiany-
Kukiz15.pdf [accessed: 21.11.2016].
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migrants, either refugees from Africa or those from Ukraine. After the terro-
rist attacks in Brussels in March 2016, Paweł Kukiz called on the government 
to reject the quota agreement and suggested conducting a referendum on not 
accepting migrants.105
3.4.3. Polish Political Parties and Their Attitude towards 
Migrants after the 2015 Elections
The parliamentary elections in October 2015 changed the political scene 
significantly. Law and Justice received 235 mandates,106 constituting 51.09% 
of all the mandates in the Polish Parliament. It was tantamount to an inde-
pendent government and had no need to form a coalition. This was a novelty 
in the Polish parliament, which is characterized by its high level of fragmenta-
tion and high number of political parties able to exceed the electoral threshold. 
It gave almost full freedom to legislate and decide on most significant politi-
cal issues. Differences between the former governing party and Law and Justice 
are, among others, a visible change in migration policy and the general opinion 
on receiving migrants in EU member states. From the beginning, the Polish go-
vernment voiced its deep concern about the EU’s compromise, highlighting its le-
gal flaws and growing security threats after the Paris attacks in November 2015.
The change of government took place in November 2015 and the new go-
vernment, with Beata Szydło as Prime Minister, assured that commitments 
made by previous decision-makers and leaders would be sustained. This ap-
peared to be a surprise, as previous statements and comments, especially tho-
se made by PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, unequivocally indicated the party’s 
negative attitude towards the migration crisis and decisions made by the Ci-
vic Platform government. During a debate in the Sejm in September 2015, Ja-
rosław Kaczyński criticized Ewa Kopacz for making decisions under foreign 
pressure and against society’s will. These decisions were justified by legal and 
formal restrictions which made changing the decisions impossible.107 In spite 
of the formal acceptance of the developed quota system, Law and Justice insi-
sted on passing a new migration law that took effect at the beginning of 2016. 
In February, the first debates in the Sejm took place. The idea of the new law 
105 “Kukiz apeluje do rządu: Wycofajcie się z decyzji o przyjmowaniu uchodźców”, 22 March 2016, 
http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/516264,zamachy-w-brukseli-kukiz-przyjmowanie-
uchodzcow.html [accessed: 20.11.2016]. 
106  See www.sejm.gov.pl [accessed: 20.11.2016].
107 M. Fabisiak, “PiS zmienia zdanie ws. uchodźców? Nie mamy możliwości się wycofać”, 7 Ja- 
nuary 2016, http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,141000,title,PiS-zmienia-zdanie-ws-uchodzcow-Nie-mamy-mozli 
wosci-sie-wycofac,wid,18084353,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=118473&_ticrsn=3 [accessed: 20.11.2016]. 
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rosław Kaczyński criticized Ewa Kopacz for making decisions under foreign 
pressure and against society’s will. These decisions were justified by legal and 
formal restrictions which made changing the decisions impossible.107 In spite 
of the formal acceptance of the developed quota system, Law and Justice insi-
sted on passing a new migration law that took effect at the beginning of 2016. 
In February, the first debates in the Sejm took place. The idea of the new law 
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was to condemn attempts to create permanent mechanisms of receiving re-
fugees on the EU level, to criticize the decision to relocate 120,000 people 
and finally to encourage only obeying national migration and asylum laws.108 
The act was passed by Sejm on 1 April 2016. 
After the terrorist attacks in Brussels in March 2016, Prime Minister 
Beata Szydło voiced her concern about growing security threats in Europe 
stemming from the migration crisis. The need to provide a more united front 
in the search for effective crisis solutions. These attacks also gave the govern-
ment the opportunity to make their standpoint more determined. Beata Szy-
dło almost immediately used it as an argument to withdraw from previous 
commitments by saying that: “I see no possibility for migrants to come to 
Poland at this moment”.109 Her words were then confirmed in April 2016 by 
Konrad Szymański, Secretary of State for European Issues at the Foreign Mi-
nistry, who stated that the refugee quota previously accepted by Civic Plat-
form and later by Law and Justice would not be implemented.110 Later, in 
May 2016, an act was passed on the defence of Polish sovereignty and its ci-
tizens’ laws. According to the new law, the EU’s decisions on migrants were 
forced on Poland, undermining Polish sovereignty and threatening Polish se-
curity, national identity and society itself.111 By so doing, the Law and Justice 
government withdrew from upholding the PO-PSL government’s commit-
ments, thus responding to pre-electoral suggestions that it would not let mi-
grants to come to Poland. 
Law and Justice’s takeover of power made its rapprochement with the V4 
countries possible again. In September, the Polish government together with 
the other states of the V4 proposed a compromise on EU migration policy, as 
the previous proposal to introduce refugee quotas on the number of refugees 
to be accepted in each member state turned out to be ineffective. The new pro-
posal would suggest a more voluntary system of accepting refugees and would 
enable independent decisions to be made on the extent of engagement in the 
European Union’s migration policy and migration crisis management. Deci-
sions, according to the V4 countries, should be made on the basis of each state’s 
108 “PiS chce, by Sejm przyjął uchwałę ws. uchodźców”, 9 February 2016, http://www.tvn24.pl/
wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/uchodzcy-w-polsce-pis-chce-uchwaly,617745.html [accessed: 20.09.2016]. 
109 “Polska nie przyjmie imigrantów. Szydło: Nie widzę takiej możliwości”, 23 March 2016, 
http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/polska-nie-przyjmie-imigrantow-beata-szydlo-w-wywiadzie-dla-
superstacji,artykuly,382568,1.html [accessed: 20.09.2016]. 
110 “Poland thinks EU refugee quota plan is ‘dead’, minister says”, 14 April 2016, Reuters UK, http://
uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-poland-idUKKCN0XB0K3 [accessed: 20.09.2016]. 




experience and potential.112 What is more, in October, the Polish Sejm once 
again discussed in a debate another act recognizing the European Parliament’s 
and the Council of the European Union’s decision on the mandatory refugee 
relocation mechanisms as inconsistent with the European rule of subsidiarity. 
It is important to note that all parliamentary groups supported the resolution 
project proposed by Law and Justice, even Civic Platform.113 This is evidence 
not only that Law and Justice had changed its standpoint on the migration cri-
sis, but that Civic Platform, which had at first supported Junker’s quota plan 
in spite of its concerns, had also changed its standpoint on the issue. 
PO’s shift could be the result of several reasons. First of all, as has previously 
been indicated, Polish society is rather intolerant, especially towards migrants 
from Africa and the Middle East; general support for accepting refugees is also 
lower than it is in Western countries. Public opinion also influences the stand-
point of political parties – losing in the elections resulted in Civic Platform re-
shaping its position at least to some extent. Secondly, after many incidents with 
refugees, for example, sexual harassment in Cologne and later in Stockholm, as 
well as terrorist attacks in Paris, Nice and Brussels, the openness of European 
societies and political leaders, and not only Polish, has been in constant decli-
ne. The political scenes of many European states are changing in a similar man-
ner to Poland’s – in France, anti-immigrant parties are gaining more support. 
The same process is already happening in Sweden, which until now has been 
considered as one of the most open and tolerant states. Here, the radical and 
anti-immigrant Sverigedemokraterna party is already a third power in the Riks-
dag, and its support is continuing to strengthen – in March, 18% of the electo-
rate declared their willingness to vote for the Swedish Democrats.114
3.4.4. Final Remarks
The main objective of this research was to analyse how the European migra-
tion crisis has affected the Polish political party system. The Table 3.4 shows 
how the distribution of mandates in the Polish Sejm changed after the 2015 
elections. This change was confronted with the attitude towards accepting 
immigrants in Poland by the respective parties. It must be borne in mind, 
112 “Coś drgnęło w Brukseli? Pomysł Grupy Wyszehradzkiej ws. uchodźców zyskuje poparcie Schulza 
i szefa EPP”, 25 September 2016, http://wpolityce.pl/swiat/309627-cos-drgnelo-w-brukseli-pomysl-
grupy-wyszehradzkiej-ws-uchodzcow-zyskuje-poparcie-schulza-i-epp [accessed: 20.10.2016]. 
113 “PAP, Sejm: kluby przeciw mechanizmowi przymusowej relokacji uchodźców”, 21 October 2016, http://
www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/imigranci/news,680474,sejm-kluby-przeciw-mechanizmowi-przymusowej-
relokacji-uchodzcow.html [accessed: 20.11.2016].
114 “Sweden’s Social Democrat Party Hits Record Low in Poll”, 24 January 2016, The Local, http://
www.thelocal.se/20160124/swedens-social-democrats-hit-record-low-in-poll [accessed: 18.03.2016]. 
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however, that even those parties that were more positive about the issue rema-
ined reserved, and none of them claimed that Poland should keep its doors open 
to everyone in need. In the Table 3.4, parties that were somehow combined 
before or after the elections have been presented together.
The table shows that political parties which were in favour of accepting re-
fugees lost out significantly in the 2015 elections in comparison to the previo-
us term. The only exception was the new political party Nowoczesna; however, 
this case is rather ambiguous for several reasons, and thus does not contra-
dict the overall observation implying that attitudes towards accepting migrants 
strongly affected the distribution of the votes and mandates. Those who were 
open to accepting refugees lost out and those who expressed the view that 
immigrants should not be let into Poland gained. Of course, it would be an 
over interpretation to claim that this aspect was critical to the election results. 
Obviously there were many other factors, such as the quality of the electoral 
campaign, mistakes made by the former government, promises made by the re-
spective parties, etc. Still, the correlation between attitudes towards accepting 
immigrants and the results of the 2015 elections explicitly verify the hypothesis 
that the attitude of Polish political parties towards the migration crisis affected 
the party system in Poland.
This research has also shown that Civic Platform – a big loser in the 2015 
parliamentary elections – has partially reoriented its attitude towards accepting 
migrants. This, on the other hand, confirms that as the ruling party it became, 
in a way, a prisoner of its own pro-European policy. The attitude of Poles to-
wards migrants was clear when the migration crisis began and the PO leaders 
must have been aware that, by supporting their European allies, it risked lo-
sing public support. Still, its government managed to win a great deal in terms 
of European policy. Therefore, it was hard for Civic Platform to turn its back 
on from the European Union, so the party took a moderate stand and decla-
red its acceptance of a certain number of migrants in Poland. Unfortunately 
for PO, this proved to be one of the reasons why it lost its dominant position 
in Parliament.
It might also be observed that all of the Polish political parties, no mat-
ter whether they were more eager to accept refugees in Poland, to some extent 
remained cautious of these issues. None of them openly declared that Poland 
should let in any number of migrants. These limitations were justified by eco-
nomic or security reasons. This might stem from the general attitude of Poles 
towards migrants. By being open to accepting migrants, parties would simply 
risk losing potential voters. 
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PO 197 138 -59 +
PiS 140
235 +101 -PiS 134
Zjednoczona 
Prawica 16
PSL 38 16 -22 +






Kukiz’15 0 42 +42 -
Nowoczesna 0 28 +28 +
Others and non-affiliated 29 1 -28 Not applicable
Source: own research, based on: VII kadencja Sejmu – podsumowanie w liczbach, 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/komunikat.xsp?documentId=0050D4C29C37-
DA62C1257EE5003C48DD [accessed: 15.12.2016], Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, 
Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015, http://parlament2015.pkw.
gov.pl/349_wyniki_sejm [accessed: 19.12.2016].
3.5. Conclusions
Polish migration and integration policies are still not fully developed, 
as their construction was significantly delayed compared with those of Western 
European countries. Poland’s process of EU accession process naturally boosted 
the development of migration policy in Poland. The need to regulate cases 
of migrants had an administrative, rather than a grass-roots, character – Polish 
society was not concerned with migration and integration problems as the per-
centage of migrants in the population was very low. 
When analysing Polish migration policy, it is necessary to understand the 
many determinants influencing its current shape and condition. First of all, 
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should let in any number of migrants. These limitations were justified by eco-
nomic or security reasons. This might stem from the general attitude of Poles 
towards migrants. By being open to accepting migrants, parties would simply 
risk losing potential voters. 
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Table 3.4




















PO 197 138 -59 +
PiS 140
235 +101 -PiS 134
Zjednoczona 
Prawica 16
PSL 38 16 -22 +






Kukiz’15 0 42 +42 -
Nowoczesna 0 28 +28 +
Others and non-affiliated 29 1 -28 Not applicable
Source: own research, based on: VII kadencja Sejmu – podsumowanie w liczbach, 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/komunikat.xsp?documentId=0050D4C29C37-
DA62C1257EE5003C48DD [accessed: 15.12.2016], Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, 
Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015, http://parlament2015.pkw.
gov.pl/349_wyniki_sejm [accessed: 19.12.2016].
3.5. Conclusions
Polish migration and integration policies are still not fully developed, 
as their construction was significantly delayed compared with those of Western 
European countries. Poland’s process of EU accession process naturally boosted 
the development of migration policy in Poland. The need to regulate cases 
of migrants had an administrative, rather than a grass-roots, character – Polish 
society was not concerned with migration and integration problems as the per-
centage of migrants in the population was very low. 
When analysing Polish migration policy, it is necessary to understand the 
many determinants influencing its current shape and condition. First of all, 
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there were historical determinants. Under Communist rule, Poland did not re-
spect freedom of movement and therefore, migration policy in its legal and in-
stitutional framework was only fragmented in nature. After 1989, all laws con-
cerning migration had to be adjusted to new, democratic realities. Institutions 
dedicated to aspects of migration also had to be adjusted. Therefore, in the 19th 
and at the beginning of the 20thcentury, Polish law and institutions were under-
going significant changes. The recent migration crisis seems to be the most cur-
rent incentive for reforming the legal and institutional systems, especially ta-
king into consideration the general perception of already existing mechanisms. 
All V4 states perceive them to be inadequate and inefficient in the face of gro-
wing refugee inflows into Europe. Another important historical determinant 
of Polish migration policy is the aspect of repatriation, treated as one of the core 
challenges for policy makers. The case of refugees and the provision of protec-
tion for foreigners only seem to be an additional case on the agenda. The role 
of Polish migration policy is therefore first and foremost about safeguarding the 
interests of Polish citizens, as well as being economically driven.
Since Poland did not face the challenges of multicultural societies for al-
most the entire 20th century, such problems did not constitute a significant 
issue matter in the political agenda until recent years, and was not the focus 
of much social attention. Polish society, ethnically and nationally homogeno-
us, is not familiar with coexisting with culturally different groups. It may be 
one of the reasons for which Poles demonstrate rather negative and cautious 
attitudes towards foreigners.115 Together with the increasing cultural distance 
of migrants, negative attitudes towards them grow in proportion. Polish socie-
ty is strongly embedded in traditional and Christian values, which can at le-
ast partially explain these social attitudes. The second reason for the Polish he-
sitancy towards foreigners is the fear of them being a financial burden. These 
fears concern both increasing unemployment for Poles and the financial cost 
of integration programmes (providing free medical care, legal assistance, educa-
tion, financial benefits, etc.). Another reason for fearing foreigners is negating 
the far-reaching influence of supranational bodies on national sovereignty.116 
The migration crisis and the attempt to introduce refugee quotas have been 
seen as the forced erosion of each state’s independence. The change of Polish 
government after the last elections in October 2015 and the takeover of power 
by Law and Justice (being a rather Eurosceptic political party) could be seen as 
proof of this. What is more, as a result of the migration crisis, political parties 
with strict opinions on accepting the quota system proposed by EU and which 
115 See Chapter 2, Public attitude.
116 B. Bachman, Diminishing Solidarity: Polish Attitudes toward the European Migration and Refugee 
Crisis, Migration Policy Institute, June 2016.
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are also more Eurosceptic in general came to power, a topic that was analysed 
in Chapter 3. What is more, a visible shift from close relations with EU and the 
Weimar Triangle to the tightening of cooperation and a common standpoint 
among the V4 countries can be observed.
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